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The euro was introduced on the assumption that no
large internal imbalances would ever pose a threat to its
stability. The rules set out in the Stability Pact were con-
sidered sufficiently stringent to secure the euro’s future.
Dissenting voices nevertheless abounded, within and
outside Europe. Stressing the problem of imbalances,
Friedman (1997a, 1997b, 2001) forecast that the euro
would last ten years. Similar statements were made by
Feldstein (1997), who even emphasised the danger that
the euro could potentially exacerbate political divisions
within Europe. Other critics pointed out that rules in
the Stability Pact would not prevent fiscal crises from
occurring, and, once under stress, the institutional set-
ting of the euro area would be inadequate to deal with
it (see Buiter et al. 1993, among many others). 
These analyses were not taken seriously in Europe,
where they were discarded as expressions of political
preference rather than economic expertise. After all,
the euro was very much a political enterprise, arising
from the desire to keep Europe’s divisions and poten-
tial conflicts under control after World War II. Its
introduction was arguably accelerated by the German
reunification, as France and other European coun-
tries had to be reassured that the new political geog-
raphy of Europe would not conflict with their post-
World War II strategy of reining in Germany in a
European context. While the euro will hopefully sur-
vive the present crisis, scientific honesty calls for an
acknowledgement that the early warnings cited above
were not groundless. Indeed, at the time of writing,
the euro is immersed in a deep existential crisis.
Substantial capital flight from several European
countries that have shaken European stability in
recent years are currently feeding one of the largest
economic challenges ever faced by post-war Europe. 
There are differing views on the causes of, and cures
for, this crisis. At one end of the spectrum, some ulti-
mately see it as a public debt crisis and advocate the
strengthening of political constraints on government
borrowing. Others primarily regard it as a confidence
crisis, which should be addressed by setting up a very
large rescue fund, i.e. by wielding a ‘big bazooka’.
They count on the fact that, if the crisis is truly expec-
tation-driven, the resources will never have to be used.
This chapter begins by reconsidering these and other
views, and later stresses the structural reasons for the
crisis, particularly the loss of competitiveness on the
part of some euro area countries and the resulting
surge in private and public foreign indebtedness. The
chapter closes with some policy conclusions and rec-
ommendations.
EU leaders have devoted most of their attention to
the public debt issue. The fiscal compact agreed
upon at the EU Summit on 8 December 2011 aims
to re-establish the fundamental principle of fiscal
discipline as a precondition for a viable monetary
and economic union. There is no doubt that a suc-
cessful fiscal compact would be a key step towards
rescuing the euro area from the political climate of
uncertainty that has prevailed to date. However, as
not all EU countries were willing to sign the com-
pact, it merely has the status of an intergovernmen-
tal agreement which is superseded by the EU
Treaty. Thus, the opening of the excessive deficit
procedure is not automatic as intended, but
requires an active, qualified majority decision on
the part of the Council.1 Once opened, the proce-
dure was supposed to lead to automatic conse-
quences unless a qualified majority of euro-area
member states were to oppose them. However, since
details of the compact are still to be defined at the
time of writing this report, we fear that the rules
may be diluted through various compromises made
even after the deficit procedure has been opened.
Indeed, it is very likely that there will still be
(1) political decision-making on fines (although
with a reversed qualified majority) and (2) fines
that countries can pay with borrowed money that
could become part of a future bail-out. That does
not constitute a strong sanction. In EEAG (2003),
Chapter 2, we proposed (1) that sanctions should
be decided by the Court of Justice and (2) that
1 See European Council (2011a,b).
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ing power).2 Since such changes are not likely, one
should not expect the fiscal compact to be binding.
In our view, a credible strategy for getting the euro
area back on track needs to consider two key prob-
lems: 
i) The emergence of large intra-euro area imbalances
reflected in the misalignment of price and wage
levels, as well as in sizeable current account deficits
and surpluses and net foreign asset positions.
ii) The emergence of massive cross-border capital
flight, recorded by exorbitantly large claims between
national central banks within the Eurosystem,
pointing to a loss of confidence in the policies of
some euro area countries. 
To solve the first problem, the euro area requires an
internal realignment of real exchange rates. As a cur-
rency realignment is precluded by the very existence
of a common currency, adjustment can only occur via
changes in price, wage or productivity levels.
To solve the second problem, a mechanism is needed
that re-establishes the market’s confidence in continued
lending to the respective countries, provides immediate
liquidity assistance to countries while they try to imple-
ment necessary policy measures and slows down capi-
tal flight. The euro area needs a credible plan to simul-
taneously address fundamental imbalances and to stem
the possibility of self-fulfilling runaway processes due
to the less-than-perfect credibility of policy plans, at
both a national and a euro area level.3
The crisis has made it quite clear that, in the case of
independent states, country-specific risk is bound to
be priced by the market sooner or later. Large price
differentials for government bonds can only jeopar-
dise the work of the European Central Bank (ECB),
and blur the distinction between standard and non-
standard monetary operations on the one hand, and
fiscal interventions on the other. Moreover, such dif-
ferentials can feed large and destabilising cross-border
capital flows into the countries issuing relatively safer
assets.
With independent states, the liability principle, where-
by each state is ultimately responsible for its debt,
needs to be clearly inscribed in the new fiscal com-
pact. This will allow for interest differentials among
national borrowers. Yet, to function properly, the euro
area also needs a core system of common assets that
are of a sufficiently high quality to provide a Euro  -
pean safe asset. A homogenous, commonly guaran-
teed bond or bill may, in principle, satisfy the need for
a common safe asset, but is hardly consistent with the
liability principle, given the present lack of political
integration. National bills subject to common rules
and satisfying strict standards may, however, offer a
viable alternative to a homogenous Eurobond and
serve the same purpose. Section 2.6 of this chapter
defines and proposes such a European standard bill. 
2.2 Capital flights are shaking macroeconomic 
stability in Europe
While there is hope that the euro will survive, albeit on
shaky foundations, its founders must have deemed it
unconceivable that the newly created currency area
would ever experience capital flights as large as, or
even larger than, the flows that have torpedoed finan-
cial and currency stability in emerging markets from
Latin America to Central Europe and Eastern Asia in
the past. Yet massive capital outflows from the crisis
countries are now a fact.
2.2.1 Fundamentals and ‘confidence’
It is well known that, once policymakers have lost
credibility, the economy can be shaken by belief-dri-
ven speculative attacks of a magnitude only loosely
related to fundamentals (Calvo 1988, Cole and Kehoe
2000). De Grauwe (2011) and others have pointed out
that self-fulfilling speculative spirals can severely
damage a government’s creditworthiness. If some in  -
vestors begin to doubt that a country will be able to
repay its public debt, they will sell the respective gov-
ernment bonds they hold, making the price of these
bonds fall and the effective interest rates rise. 
There are all kinds of market dynamics that can feed
such attacks. A key pattern consists of herd behav-
iour. The price decline stokes uncertainty among
other investors, who also sell their assets to avoid cap-
ital losses, inducing a further decline. This, in turn,
makes more investors apprehensive, potentially caus-
ing panic in the end. 
Once such an attack is set in motion, governments
have to offer higher yields for newly issued govern-
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ment debt, which increases the interest burden in their
budgets and prompts them to borrow more to finance
this burden. This leads to progressively higher debt-
to-GDP ratios, which further undermine the confi-
dence of investors and induce them to charge an even
higher interest rate. At the moment such mutually
reinforcing runaway processes are clearly destabilising
the financial system of the euro area.4
These analyses are plausible, but they need to be com-
plemented by two important observations. Firstly,
self-fulfilling speculative attacks do not arise when
policies and institutional arrangements are credible.
Good fundamentals and sound institutions prevent
belief-driven destabilisation. In this sense, the current
crisis in Europe cannot be exclusively due to confi-
dence factors – it also is the result of years of distort-
ed growth, during which some European countries
ran large current account and/or public deficits, or
allowed their banks to take on too much risk, and let
unit labour costs rise relative to those of other mem-
bers of the euro area.
Secondly, with imperfect policy credibility, confidence
crises do impact negatively the macroeconomic
process, generating a strong recessionary impulse. In
Europe, the risk premiums on government debt spill-
over to the borrowing costs of residents in the respec-
tive country. In other words, firms and households in
the periphery countries see their creditworthiness and
their ability to borrow closely tied to that of their gov-
ernments. High and volatile sovereign risk spreads
have generated a lethal credit crunch in these coun-
tries, producing the premises of a deep recession in
2012 in some of those countries.
The idea of a public debt crisis
spiral – a government that is sol-
vent when it has to pay up to
5 percent interest on its debt may
become insolvent if it has to pay
10 percent – is an intuitive expla-
nation, but fails to capture the
true economic essence of the
problem. Gloomy expectations
of a recession can become self-
fulfilling because, as soon as
firms and households expect a
slowdown in growth, they also
expect the government budget to
deteriorate (due to falling tax revenues). To the extent
that this raises the risk premiums on government
bonds and these are correlated to those on private
debt, it also feeds back directly into the interest paid
by the private sector. Even if policy interest rates
remain close to zero, the economy nevertheless expe-
riences the equivalent of a monetary contraction in
such a scenario.5
It follows that analyses stressing confidence as a key
factor responsible for driving interest rate differentials
in Europe should also stress the following two facts.
Firstly, confidence crises only occur when fundamen-
tals are already weakened. Secondly, once set in
motion, they are equivalent to sharp negative shocks
to the macroeconomy.
2.2.2 The confidence crisis
The mere fact of a confidence crisis resulting in capi-
tal flight and differing risk perceptions, whether fun-
damental or expectations-driven, can best be illustrat-
ed by looking at interest spreads and asset values.
Figure 2.1 shows how interest rates for ten-year gov-
ernment bonds have evolved during the financial cri-
sis. As is well known, the interest rates for all euro area
countries were nearly identical until the first half of
2008, they began to differ after the collapse of
Lehman Brothers and they exploded after spring
2010. Greek rates peaked temporarily on Wednesday
28 April 2010. During that day, the interest rate for
two-year Greek government bonds soared to 38 per-
cent (although it settled at a lower rate at the end of
that day). The markets were obviously jumpy. 
4 See Krugman (2011a) who compares the
situation with a vicious circle.
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Figure 2.1As discussed in greater detail
below, the European Union re  -
acted by creating a rescue pro-
gramme for Greece and estab-
lishing the European Financial
Stability Facility (EFSF) on 8/9
May 2010. These measures led
to a temporary reduction in the
spreads. However, from 1 June
2010 onwards the Greek rate
started to rise again, with
momentary periods of relief,
and went beyond 35 percent by
the end of last year. Meanwhile,
a second rescue program for
Greece of 130 billion euros was
announced, the details of which
were not yet known at the time
of this writing. All of these
measures were obviously unable to prevent the
Greek risk premium from rising to levels signalling
catastrophe. Including ECB support (purchases of
government bonds and Target credits), the total
level of public credit already granted to Greece
could now total around 390 billion euros (see also
Figure 2.10).6
After some delay the interest rates of Ireland and
Portugal followed suit. However, whereas the
Portuguese rate kept rising, the Irish rate peaked in
June 2011, declined substantially thereafter, and
began to rise again in November. The Italian and
Spanish rates also rose gradually, but steadily com-
pared to those of Germany. The crisis has now affect-
ed the interest paid by France, Austria and Belgium.
Even the negative risk premiums allowing Germany
to borrow at extremely favourable rates have been
fluctuating with market confidence. 
As outstanding government bonds have a given
statutory rate of interest, they adjust to the rising
interest rates with declining market values. Figure
2.2 shows the development of the market values of
ten-year government bonds issued in 2006 and
2007. Greek sovereigns fell to less than 30 percent
of their face value by the end of 2011, Portuguese
sovereigns to less than 70 percent, Irish sovereigns
to less than 80 percent, Italian sovereigns to less
than 90 percent and Spanish sovereigns to slightly
above 90 percent. 
The losses in market value put a substantial strain on
the balance sheets of investment funds, insurance
companies and commercial banks worldwide. In
Europe, France was hit particularly hard, because its
banking sector was far more strongly exposed to the
Southern countries’ public debt than that of any other
nation. Insofar as banks were holding government
bonds on their trading books, they were obliged to
show write-off losses on their balance sheets.
However, as most government bonds are held on their
banking books, the majority of write-off losses
remain hidden to date. Even the stress tests carried
out by the European Banking Authority (EBA) have
not seriously attempted to address this issue. 
Despite institutional reluctance to address this issue
openly, the repercussions on the private economy were
significant. Banks and financial intermediaries react-
ed to the imminent write-off losses by rebalancing
their lending strategies. The fall in the price of gov-
ernment bonds affected the creditworthiness of those
private agents who held them in their portfolios. The
fiscal squeeze implied by higher public borrowing
costs and calls for higher taxes, higher tariffs and
more expensive public services also gave rise to the
expectation of strikes and other forms of protest that
would hamper production and distribution. This all
implied that borrowing in the private sector became
more expensive as public borrowing costs rose. The
correlation coefficient between the public and private
risk premiums tends to be quite high, especially for
the euro area countries subject to fiscal stress (see for
instance, Corsetti et al. 2011). While a high correla-
tion could, in principle, reflect two-way causality
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(from the private crisis to its pub-
lic counterpart and vice-versa), it
is apparent that, once a sovereign
state is in trouble, the prevailing
direction goes from public to pri-
vate. Thus, the rising interest
spreads were not limited to the
public sector, but affected entire
economies.7
2.3 Over-borrowing, over-lending
and the loss of competitiveness
While it is obvious that capital
flight from the crisis-hit countries
has occurred, it is not clear
whether this was due to an irra-
tional or a rational market reac-
tion to conflicting information about country funda-
mentals, the firepower of rescue facilities and other
such factors. After all, fundamentals are not only sub-
ject to present destabilising forces, but are also influ-
enced by their stabilising counterparts. The lower the
market value of existing government bonds falls, the
larger the profit investors will make if a country does
indeed repay its debt. Thus, falling prices also trigger
more demand for such bonds, which limits the run-
away process. The recovery of Irish government
bonds from spring to autumn 2011 can be interpreted
in this light. 
In fact, if the default probabilities differ, the statutory
interest rates for government bonds from different
countries should also differ, for if they do not, the
mathematically expected interest rates (in short: the
effective interest rates) differ by the default probabili-
ty. For simplicity, consider the extreme (and unrealis-
tic) case where default means that no money is paid
back. If, say, the annual statutory interest rate of a
country is i and the annual default probability is p, the
effective rate of interest is i – p. Thus, equality of the
effective interest rates requires spreading the statutory
interest rates in line with the differing default proba-
bilities.
In EEAG (2011) we emphasised that, for this reason,
it would be wrong to worry unduly about interest rate
differentials within the euro area.8 On the contrary,
interest differentials are a necessary ingredient for a
functioning European capital market, since they send
price signals to borrowers and investors. If a country
borrows too much or is hit by a negative shock, its
increasing default probability should indeed be
reflected in rising interest rates to provide sufficient
incentives for adjustment.9
Let us suppose that interest spreads were to be sup-
pressed artificially by letting countries issue unlim-
ited amounts of homogeneous Eurobonds, i.e.
bonds jointly guaranteed by all euro area countries.
In this scenario, a country could de facto reduce its
effective interest rate simply by borrowing more,
because this would increase its default probability
and hence the probability of shifting the repayment
burden to the other countries guaranteeing the
debt. Note that a lower effective interest rate would
then induce the country to borrow even more. A
vicious feedback effect could be activated: borrow-
ing more would further increase the probability of
default, thereby reducing the effective interest rate
even further, and strengthening the incentive to
borrow. 
In the extreme case where borrowers know for sure
that they will not be able to repay the extra money
borrowed and are nonetheless allowed to participate
in Eurobond issuances, there is no intrinsic limitation
to their borrowing. For such countries this means
increasing living standards today without reducing
them in the future. Credit given by other countries in
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7 Harjes (2011) estimates a pass-through coefficient, from public to
private borrowing cost, as high as 50 percent.
8 See EEAG (2011), Chapter 2.
9 If they were not, the implication would be that either investors are
irrational, or they anticipate a bail-out.There seems to be a broad consensus that Eurobonds
of this kind are not to be introduced in the foreseeable
future. Yet there is also ample evidence that the intro-
duction of the euro itself produced similar effects in
the years before the crisis, because it suggested to
investors that all euro countries would be ‘sitting in
the same boat’ and would therefore have the same
default probability. This belief clearly contradicted
the no-bail-out clause of the Maastricht Treaty, but it
was not entirely irrational, given that the regulators
themselves obviously shared it. After all, the Euro  -
pean governments had managed to free banks from
the obligation of holding equity against government
bonds in the Basel regulatory framework, arguing that
all government bonds would be perfectly safe assets.10
Thus, in a sense, the euro was already perceived to be
a kind of Eurobond system, and therefore induced the
runaway process in terms of the excessive borrowing
described above. 
Figure 2.3, which extends Figure 2.1 to earlier years,
shows the rapid convergence of interest rates before
the introduction of the euro. While undervaluation
of credit risk over the past decade was more of a
global phenomenon than specific to the euro area,
the new currency undoubtedly contributed to it, and
quite decisively. The present crisis was preceded by
roughly a decade of uniform interest rates, extend-
ing from 1998 to 2008. Prior to 1998 interest rates
had varied substantially because investors faced
country-specific depreciation risks for which the
countries had to pay a premium over the German
Bund. That phase ended with the EU Summit in
Madrid in December 1995, when the ultimate deci-
sion to introduce the euro was
made and it was foreseeable
which countries would be join-
ing and when the exchange rates
would be irrevocably fixed
(which happened in May 1998).
Within just two years, 1996 and
1997, all interest rates except
that of Greece converged to the
Bund level. The Greek rate con-
verged later, as the drachma was
not among the currencies for
which the ex  change rate had
been previously fixed and be  -
cause Greece did not join the
euro area until 2001, two years
after the other countries.
The similarity between pre-euro interest dispersion
and today’s dispersion is striking. In the past interest
rates diverged due to the fear of depreciation; now
they do so because of the fear of default. As discussed
above, while the chart refers to the interest rate on
public debt, the convergence was much more general
and also included private interest rates. The general
drop in interest rates triggered an expansion in coun-
tries which had hitherto been obliged to pay a premi-
um, as the lower interest rate induced private and
public agents to borrow more. In Portugal and Greece
the government sector took the opportunity to hire
more employees at higher wages, while in Ireland and
Spain the private sector built more homes, created
employment and gave higher wages to construction
workers. In the end, it made little difference which sec-
tor acted first. As the construction workers paid more
taxes, the government sector was pulled along; and as
government employees used their wages to build more
homes, the construction sector benefited. This all gen-
erated a boom with high growth rates, declining rates
of unemployment, high wage increases and high rates
of inflation. 
From 1995, the beginning of interest convergence, to
2008, the year of the full outbreak of the financial
crisis, Ireland grew by 118 percent, Spain by 56 per-
cent, Greece by 55 percent and Portugal by 33 per-
cent, while the euro area average was 31 percent.
Germany, on the other hand, suffered from an
extremely low rate of net investment (the lowest of
all OECD countries) and grew by only 22 percent
during this period. Among the countries now in cri-
sis, only Italy did not participate in the boom: its
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growth rate was 19 percent, even lower than that of
Germany. 
Figure 2.4 shows that prices also increased rapidly. In
the period under consideration, the price level of
domestically produced goods and services (GDP
deflator) in Greece increased by 67 percent. In con-
trast, the price level in Germany increased by only
9 percent. This obviously meant that Germany depre-
ciated in real terms compared to its trading partners,
while Greece appreciated. Italian prices also rose by
41 percent, but unlike the other countries now in cri-
sis, Italian inflation seems to have resulted from an
internal cost push, rather than a demand-driven
boom. The box in the chart gives the exact figures,
which also take into account the last currency realign-
ments to occur before the exchange rates were irrevo-
cably fixed in May 1998. Germany depreciated against
its euro area trading partners by 22 percent, whereas
the GIIPS countries appreciated by 30 percent against
theirs.11
Over time the appreciating countries developed cur-
rent account deficits, as rising prices undermined
the competitiveness of their exports and rising real
incomes boosted imports. This phenomenon is illus-
trated by Figure 2.5, which depicts the average cur-
rent account deficits in the years 2005–2010.
Portugal and Greece had truly huge current account
deficits of 10.8 percent and 11.7 percent of GDP
respectively. Spain’s deficit of 7.6 percent of GDP
was also alarmingly large. The deficits of Italy
(2.0 percent) and Ireland (3.5 percent) were much
smaller. While the Irish current account deficit dis-
appeared as early as 2010, Italy’s deficit kept rising,
reaching a level of 3.5 percent in
2010. The deficits posted by
Greece and Portugal, by con-
trast, settled at 10.1 percent and
10.0 percent respectively in that
year. Recent estimates for 2011
show that the joint current
account deficits of the GIIPS
countries will total around
127 billion euros, or 4.0 percent of their joint GDP
(see European Commission 2011).
The current account deficits are, by definition, identi-
cal to the respective capital imports that these coun-
tries absorbed. Current account deficits and capital
flows are jointly determined by economic forces. The
causal origin of an imbalance can in principle come
from the goods and services, as well as from the capi-
tal markets. As argued above, however, there is ample
evidence that, in the period considered, the imbal-
ances in the euro area originated in the capital market.
The announcement and introduction of the euro (in a
period of global undervaluation of risk) constituted a
unique and strong shock to Western Europe’s econo-
my that led to extreme and unusual cross-border cap-
ital movements.12 In those countries subject to capital
inflows, the economy underwent a growth process
with sustained increases in prices and rising current
account deficits. In Germany, which suffered from a
capital outflow, the real economy and prices stagnat-
ed, turning its current account deficit into a surplus,
as the competitiveness of exporting industries in  -
creased and imports were held back by stagnating
incomes. Germany’s current account surplus, and
hence Germany’s net capital export, totalled 6.1 per-
cent of GDP in the period 2005–2010. In absolute
terms, the current account surplus in 2011 is estimat-
ed to be 131 billion euros. 
A current account deficit measures the annual
increase in the net foreign debt position of a country,
and a current account surplus represents the annual
increase in its net foreign asset position.13 Figures 2.6
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Source: Eurostat, Ifo Institute calculations.
Figure 2.5
11 We use the term GIPS for Greece,
Ireland, Portugal and Spain and GIIPS for
these countries plus Italy. 
12 This was predicted in Sinn and Koll
(2000) and re-examined in Sinn (2010). See
also Sinn et al. (2011).
13 For the net foreign asset position revalu-
ation, however, adjustments due to chang-
ing market values and exchange rates of
foreign assets are added. Such revaluation
adjustments are not included in the cur-
rent account flows.countries that had accumulated by June 2011, in
terms of percent of GDP and in terms of euros
respectively. 
It is worth noting that Italy’s net foreign debt posi-
tion, while sizeable in absolute terms (due to the eco-
nomic size of this country), amounts to only 26 per-
cent of GDP. This is due to the fact that Italy has not
traditionally delved into foreign borrowing, so an
external deficit has emerged only recently. For the rest
of the crisis-hit countries, however, net foreign debt
amounts to a startling 95 percent of GDP, with little
variation between individual countries (95 percent for
Greece, 86 percent for Ireland, 105 percent for
Portugal and 95 percent for Spain). The latter figures
are very large by historical standards, and they
arguably show more clearly than
any other indicator the funda-
mental macroeconomic imbal-
ances in the crisis-hit countries. 
As discussed below, the true situ-
ation in the periphery countries is
even worse than suggested by
these figures, since in the boom
years nominal GDP – to which
the debt is related – was inflated
by rapid nominal growth (reflect-
ing both high real growth and
large price increases). Indeed, in
the pre-euro period, it seemed for
a number of years that public and
private debt levels could be kept
in check because of the rapid
increase in nominal incomes.
With the crisis shattering any exuberant expectations
about prospective growth, it is now clear that the
inflated price and wage levels in the first years of the
euro are not sustainable. The bitter truth facing the cri-
sis countries today is that, as their goods must become
cheaper for them to regain competitiveness, this will at
least initially increase their debt-to-GDP ratios.
No less than 52 percent of the total net foreign debt
of the GIIPS countries, or about 1021 billion euros,
is accounted for by Spain. 417 billion euros or
21 percent by Italy, and 521 billion euros or 27 per-
cent by Greece, Ireland and Portugal combined. The
Spanish figure may look less alarming insofar as
Spain has a relatively low ratio of public debt to
GDP, which totalled about 70 percent in 2011. This
is a better ratio than the euro
area average (88 percent). How  -
ever, as explained, it was largely
the real-estate sector that
absorbed the foreign credit in
Spain. The sector experienced a
classical real-estate bubble that,
when it burst, generated a high
rate of unemployment that has
now reached more than 20 per-
cent, concentrated among the
young. Spain is not a small
country like Greece or Ireland,
but one of the euro area’s biggest
economies. The sheer size of its
outstanding foreign debt is a
major threat to the stability of
the euro area. 
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On the other side of the balance are countries like
Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. It is impor-
tant to note that the German net foreign asset posi-
tion, amounting to 949 billion euros or 37 percent of
GDP in June 2011, is about as large as Spain’s net for-
eign debt in absolute terms. The combined net foreign
wealth of Belgium and the Netherlands, on the other
hand, largely offsets the net foreign debt of Italy. By
mid-2011 even the euro area’s entire net foreign asset
position was negative (– 820 billion euros).
2.4 Capital flights and the euro area’s internal 
balance-of-payments imbalances
Initially, the relative high inflation in the periphery
countries was often interpreted as inherent in the
process of productivity and price convergence due to
capital flows from the core.14 Increasingly, however, it
also reflected overly-optimistic expectations that the
then rising trend in income and real-estate prices
would continue into the future (and/or that their
investment would be somehow guaranteed). At a
global level, such an illusion burst in the period from
August 2007, when the interbank market first seized
up, to October 2008, when the collapse of Lehman
Brothers triggered a major financial crisis in the
United States and Europe. These events undermined
the assumption that former high-interest countries
would be safer than before the introduction of the
euro, while equity losses on US structured securities
forced banks to deleverage by pulling out of risky
investments. Borrowing in the interbank markets
became more expensive and virtually impossible at
times. Across borders, these problems reflected the
reluctance of investors to finance the imbalances of
crisis countries. In some cases capital even fled abroad
on a dramatic scale in anticipation of the adjustments
to come. 
As is well known, the ECB, like central banks in the
United States and elsewhere, stepped in decisively, de
facto substituting for the freezing interbank market.
Direct borrowing and lending between bank A and B,
wherever located, was replaced by the indirect flow of
credit via the Eurosystem (the ECB and the national
central banks in the euro area). While the replacement
was unrelated to national boundaries in principle, in
practice it meant that the countries of the periphery
received a public capital flow via the Eurosystem that
replaced the stalling inflows of private capital previ-
ously financing their current account deficits. The
borrowing commercial banks received more refinanc-
ing credit from their National Central Banks (NCBs),
while the ‘lending’ banks either placed the funds that
they no longer dared to lend (and thus export) in time
deposits or in the ‘deposit facility’ with their NCBs, or
took less central bank refinancing credit in the first
place. By compensating for the portfolio choice of the
markets, the activities of the Eurosystem had auto-
matically avoided the disruptive balance-of-payments
crises that usually accompany massive capital flights
of the kind now being experienced by the crisis coun-
tries in the euro area. However, the intervention also
has relevant implications for the allocation of capital
in Europe. 
The replacement credit flowing through the ECB sys-
tem is indirectly measured by the so-called Target
accounts. ‘Target’ is the name of the euro area’s elec-
tronic payment system. A payment system like Target
is an essential building block of a monetary union,
and the key vault for the smooth operations of finan-
cial markets, especially monetary policy. In normal
times, i.e. without large risk premiums in interbank
markets, the transactions via Target accounts may or
may not net out, yet there is no implicit subsidy to
capital movements. During the crisis, however, the
Target system recorded huge imbalances, turning it
into a seismograph of the shock waves that capital
markets sent through the Eurosystem.15 The opera-
tion of the Target system guaranteed liquidity at basi-
cally risk free rates to national financial systems and
governments facing difficulties.
More specifically, the Target accounts measure the
imbalances resulting from the reluctance of the capi-
tal markets to continue financing the current account
deficits of the periphery countries and from the out-
right capital flight from these countries. 
As the interbank market broke down, the capital
inflow from private lending operations and asset pur-
chases went missing in the periphery countries. In
fact, capital was flowing out as foreign banks repatri-
ated the funds they had been lending and domestic
investors began to exchange domestic for foreign
assets to safeguard their wealth. This created a net
flow of money through the Target system. 
Considered on their own, these movements of funds
across the borders would have reduced the stock of
14 See, e.g., Sinn and Reutter (2000) and Sinn and Koll (2000) as well
as the critical review of these interpretations in Sinn (2010).
15 See Sinn (2011a,b), Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2011) and CESifo
(2012).base (central bank) money in the
crisis countries and increased it
in the receiving countries.
However, common monetary
policy at the euro area level
ensures that these flows are fully
and automatically sterilised.
Banks in the countries sending
the money drew more refinanc-
ing credit and money from their
NCBs to replace the outflow of
money via the Target system;
while banks in the receiving
countries lent the money seeping
in to their respective NCB or
took less refinancing credit in the
first place, because they did not
need the extra liquidity. Thus,
neither the aggregate stock of
base money nor its distribution
among the countries was affected.16 The Target bal-
ances recorded in the national balance sheets there-
fore also measure the reallocation of net central bank
credit between countries, or equivalently, a credit pro-
vision between the central banks replacing stalling
private capital flows, as argued above.
The orange curve in Figure 2.8 shows the develop-
ment of negative Target balances at the central banks
in the GIPS countries compared to the Eurosystem,
and the blue curve shows the corresponding develop-
ment of positive Target balances at the Bundesbank.17
Sizeable cross-border net flows of funds within the
euro area clearly began in the summer of 2007 and
have continued unabated, with short lulls, ever since.
By December 2011, a huge stock of Target credit had
accumulated in Germany, amounting to 463 billion
euros. This represents about half of Germany’s net
foreign wealth as reported in Figure 2.7. In addition,
capital also fled towards non-euro area countries like
Switzerland, Japan and the United States.
The internal euro area balance-of-payments imbal-
ances have been so huge and persistent for over four
years that the money flowing in electronically from
the euro area’s periphery (GIIPS countries) has now
entirely eliminated, in an accounting sense, the stock
of net NCBs credit to the banking system in the core
(the non-GIIPS countries).18 The process has ab  -
sorbed the entire net central bank credit in the core
and has even made it negative (– 222 billion euros in
October 2011). While this has not resulted in a credit
squeeze in the core economies, due to the fact that
capital was chasing ‘safe’ assets,19 the core NCBs have
now become net debtors to their respective commer-
cial banking systems.20
Of course, the replacement of private credit with pub-
lic credit via the Eurosystem, as shown by the Target
balances, would have been more difficult had the ECB
not reduced its collateral requirements for refinancing
credit. As early as 15 October 2008, in the week fol-
lowing the Washington G7 agreement to rescue all
systemically relevant banks, the ECB Council reduced
the creditworthiness of the required collateral from
A- to BBB- (see Table 2.1). It announced that it would
return to normal collateral requirements by De  -
cember 2009, but the Council postponed and ulti-
mately shelved this plan. Moreover, it subsequently
suspended any rating requirement for Greek, Irish
and Portuguese government bonds submitted by com-
mercial banks as collateral for refinancing credit.
Although the ECB required a discount on the face
value of the government bonds, this step was decisive
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16 For further details see Sinn (2011b) and Sinn and Wollmershäuser
(2011, Section 7).
17 To the extent the data are published they stem from the NCBs’ bal-
ance sheets. Otherwise, they are reconstructed from IMF statistics.
For details see Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2011, see in particular the
appendix of the NBER version of that paper). The ECB itself does
not possess a comprehensive data set but reconstructed the data for
missing countries in the same way as was done by these authors. We
find this lack of statistics on the part of the ECB unacceptable and
urgently recommend that statistics offering the necessary clarity are
provided by the ECB, see European Central Bank (2011, p. 37, foot-
note 5).
18 See Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2011), Figure 9.
19 See Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2010, Figure 7 and related discus-
sion) as well as the Sinn (2011a,b). 
20 Tornell and Westermann (2011, 2012) and Kohler (2012) have
argued that this may pose severe problems in terms of the sustain-
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in providing banks with the low-cost credit that the
market was no longer willing to provide. In addition,
the ECB generously accepted non-marketable assets
and asset-backed securities the banks had themselves
created out of their credit portfolios (often protected
by national state guarantees). The share of these two
latter categories in the submitted collateral increased
from about 15 percent to over 40 percent in the peri-
od from 2006 to 2010.21
While there is disagreement on the modalities and the
extent of the ECB interventions, there is no doubt
that the ECB had to act in an institutional void – as
no explicit mechanism to deal with a crisis was envi-
sioned in the treaties. Initially, the ECB policy actions
handled liquidity problems in the financing of ailing
banks and financial systems in both the core and the
periphery countries. With the emergence of sovereign
and jurisdiction risk, however, the interventions of the
ECB started to have specific implications for financ-
ing balance-of-payments deficits, cushioning possible
disruptive effects of capital flights, and public budget
deficits. Effectively, they have resulted in the financing
of government debt by the Eurosystem that arti-
cle 123 of the EU Treaty had intended to prohibit.
This process has not produced overall monetisation,
but it has implied a redistribution of credit risks
across national boundaries.
It is useful to look at the ECB’s interventions from the
viewpoint of a normal balance-of-payments crisis. In
the absence of a common currency (in this case the
euro), massive capital flight or current account
deficits usually force a central bank to increase
domestic interest rates, and/or use its international
reserves, possibly borrowing from other central banks,
and eventually accepting a currency depreciation.
This limits the sustainability of balance-of-payments
deficits. In the euro area, however, there is theoretical-
ly no such limit if the ECB accepts sufficiently low
collateral for refinancing credits.
The accumulated financial flows
intermediated by the Eurosystem
are simply recorded as account-
ing credit and debit across NCBs.
In other words, when bank A is
located in a different country to
bank B, the Eurosystem interme-
diation shows up on the balance
sheets of the individual NCBs.
As NCBs merely record the flows
in their accounts, the credit and
debit records cancel each other out in the
Eurosystem’s consolidated balance sheet, and there is
no net creation of central bank money (monetary
base) in the process.
A few formal identities may help clarify the relation-
ship between the Target accounts and the balance of
payment. For our purposes, we use the customary def-
inition of the capital account that records the activity
of private agents as well as fiscal rescue operations,
but excludes official settlements across borders, which
is the balance of payments.22 The definition of the
balance of payments is thus simply the sum of the
current account and the portion of the capital
account excluding official settlements. For transac-
tions across countries with independent currencies,
balance-of-payments deficits and surpluses are usual-
ly settled in official reserve currencies (dollars, euros,
yen, sterling, Swiss francs), or by changes in the
amount of Special Drawing Rights (a type of
accounting currency) at the International Monetary
Fund (IMF). 
Within the euro area, the settlement occurs in terms of
net flows of euros via the Target system, involving
debit and credit accounting across NBCs. Thus, the
Target account in principle is the intra-euro area bal-
ance of payments. The two concepts are basically syn-
onymous.23
A balance-of-payment or Target deficit always results
from an imbalance between the total current account
and how much of it the capital market is willing to
finance. There is a balance-of-payment deficit if the
capital market is willing to finance only a fraction of
the current account deficit, and an even greater deficit
Table 2.1 
ECB collateral requirements 
Date  Minimum credit rating threshold 
Until 14 October 2008  A-  
15 October 2008  BBB- 
10 May 2010   Suspended for Greece* 
31 March 2011  Suspended for Ireland* 
7 July 2011  Suspended for Portugal* 
* For debt instruments issued or guaranteed by the government. 
Source: Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2011, NBER version). 
21 See Rocholl (2010).
22 The statistical terminology distinguishes between capital account
and financial account in the balance of payments. To simplify the
language, the term ‘capital account’ in this chapter refers to the sum
of capital account and the financial account of the balance of pay-
ments.
23 See Sinn (2011a), Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2011) and Homburg
(2012).if, in addition, private capital flows out in net terms.
For any given current account deficit, an increase in
capital outflows necessarily results in an additional
balance-of-payment deficit. As a result of capital
flight, it is possible to simultaneously have a current
account surplus and a balance-of-payment deficit.
The combination of external imbalances in both the
current account and the capital account is creating
enormous imbalances in balances of payments within
the euro area. The charts in Figure 2.9 show how
Target credit relates to the current account deficits of
each of the GIIPS. The red curve indicates the stock
of Target credit as shown in Figure 2.8, and the blue
curve shows the current account balance accumulated
from 1 January 2008. It refers to the auxiliary coordi-
nate system also shown in blue. It is important to note
that both lines represent stocks rather than flows. 
By definition, the current account must be financed
with either ordinary capital imports or Target credit.
Thus, if in Figure 2.9 the (blue) current account line is
above the (red) Target line, the vertical distance
between these two lines measures the cumulated ordi-
nary capital import since 1 January 2008, and if the
Target line is above the current account line, the dis-
tance measures the cumulated ordinary capital export. 
The charts for Greece and Portugal show that over the
three years from 2008 to 2010, their current account
deficits were nearly entirely financed with Target cred-
it. In net terms there was hardly any net private capi-
tal inflow over the three years under consideration.
Thus, these two countries had been benefiting from
net official assistance de facto well before the official
public rescue operations started in 2010. They were
effectively protected from an early and painful capital
account reversal. This assistance allowed them to
receive a net inflow of goods from other countries to
the tune of 140 billion euros over the three years of
the crisis: Greece and Portugal were effectively draw-
ing credit from other euro area NCBs at below market
rates. While no parliament was involved in deciding
on this credit, in economic terms it was quite similar
to an open rescue credit via the EFSF, for example,
which taps funds from the core and lends them to the
periphery. Even the liability aspects are very similar,
for if these countries go bankrupt and their collateral,
largely government bonds, falls in value, the surviving
euro countries are to share the liability according to
their respective ECB capital
shares, which is exactly the liabil-
ity sharing rule for EFSF credits.
As shown in Figure 2.10, support
from the Eurosystem to date
clearly exceeds any assistance
paid out in terms of rescue loans
by the community of states. 
In Ireland the Target credit vastly
exceeds the accumulated current
account deficit (of about 14 bil-
lion euros). It mainly corre-
sponds to huge net outflows of
private capital totalling around
130 billion euros. Predominantly
this represented a withdrawal of
those short-term funds that the
banks of the core had been lend-
ing to Ireland.
In Spain the Target credit covered
about a quarter of the current
account deficit in the years
2008–2010, which amounted to
around 200 billion euros. Three
quarters of the accumulated cur-
rent account deficit was financed
with private credit. 
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As shown in Figure 2.8, Italian Target liabilities did
not start to grow until later (from July 2011 onward).
The chart clearly shows that the Target curve became
much steeper than the current account curve at that
point, indicating capital flight. As Italian and foreign
investors started to reduce their exposure to Italian
assets and to purchase assets abroad, the Eurosystem,
through the Banca d’Italia, provided liquidity to
Italian banks to compensate for the shrinking inter-
bank loans.
In the second half of 2011 the Italian net private asset
position swung completely. The capital flight that has
occurred since then has more than offset Italy's capi-
tal import since the beginning of 2008. As of the end
of 2011, Target finance was even a little higher than
the sum of the current account deficits over these four
years.
The main recipient of outflows from Italy was
Germany. As mentioned above, by the end of last
year, Germany had accumulated Target claims of
around 460 billion euros, or half of the country’s net
foreign asset position. Moreover, even before Italy
started to suffer large outflows, the Bundesbank’s
Target claims had grown substantially in the years
2008–2010, almost accounting for Germany’s entire
current account surplus with the rest of the euro area.
So, while the German current account surplus with
the rest of the euro area was 264 billion euros over the
three years mentioned, Germany’s Target claims
increased by 255 billion euros. Thus, 96 percent of the
current account surplus corresponded to Target
claims of the Bundesbank against the Eurosystem,
and only 4 percent, or 10 billion euros, were account-
ed for by other assets. Interestingly enough, 6 billion
of those 10 billion euros were claims resulting from
public rescue operations in favour of Greece, and only
4 billion euros represented private, marketable assets
or claims.
Capital flights of this kind have usually marked the
end of fixed exchange rate systems. Consider the
Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates that
was in place in the first post-war period up to 1973.24
Towards the end of this system, the US Federal
Reserve engaged in an excessively expansionary pol-
icy (while fiscal policy was also loose) that was no
longer compatible with the credibility of the official
conversion rate with gold, as it sustained a rate of
inflation that was clearly above inflation in
Germany. Despite capital controls, capital started to
flow from the United States into Germany and other
safe-haven currencies. As a result of the fixed
exchange rate regime, the dollars arriving in Europe
either had to be exchanged for domestic money,
increasing its overall stock or, if sterilised, had to
replace domestic refinancing credit. The inflow of
dollars (or US Treasury Bills to which they were con-
verted) accumulating in the European national
banks back then are, by and large, comparable to
today’s Target claims.
The Bretton Woods system ended soon after France
asked the United States to convert the dollars it had
accumulated into gold; the United States gave up the
gold standard at that point (1971). This cannot hap-
pen in the euro area, given that no NCB in the
Eurosystem has any right to ‘call due its Target
claims’. On the other hand, the GIIPS are, of course,
not the United States. They cannot pursue an expan-
sionary monetary policy in the face of large capital
outflows. They can, however, slow down their reform
process, or fall victim of confidence crises and keep
feeding the outflow of capital.
A more recent and relevant example is the large sys-
temic crisis of the European Monetary System in
1992–93, that derailed the plan to introduce the euro
initially set out in the Maastricht Treaty. As discussed
by Buiter et al. (1998), large imbalances emerged
because of the combined effect of a major inflation-
ary shock in Germany, and the cumulative erosion of
competitiveness in the periphery of the system. The
shock derived from the modalities of German unifi-
cation, granting a one-to-one conversion rate of East
German wages with the West, and starting a large
programme of transfers (Sinn 1992). To counter infla-
tion, the Bundesbank engaged in rapid monetary con-
traction, raising policy rates between 1990 and 1992
(in mid-1992, the German Discount and Lombard
rates were as high as 8.75 and 9.70 percent respective-
ly). With a fixed exchange rate system, the other coun-
tries in Europe were forced to adjust their rates
accordingly. To make matters worse, as doubts
emerged about their ability to remain in the fixed
exchange rate system while absorbing a strong mone-
tary contraction, a rising interest rate premium ampli-
fied the negative monetary impulse from the Bun  -
desbank. Then as now, there were widely contrasting
interpretations of the crisis: one interpretation
stressed self-fulfilling erosion of confidence, whereas
another emphasised fundamental macroeconomic
imbalances. 
24 See Tornell and Westermann (2011), Blankart (2012), Kohler
(2012) and Schlesinger (2012).Over the course of 1992, any cooperative solution –
involving a nominal appreciation of the D-mark,
which would have allowed the Bundesbank to lower
policy rates – was rejected, reflecting increasing inter-
nal divisions among policymakers. Some countries
simply refused to let their currency devalue against
the D-mark. When markets fully realised the extent of
these divisions, speculative movements became a
tsunami. The only way to resist this tsunami would
have involved active and unlimited lending of reserves
from the core and international institutions, to the
periphery countries in crisis. Under the Exchange
Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary System,
however, no obligation was present. A large balance-
of-payments imbalance immediately translated into a
balance-of-payments crisis, forcing many countries to
opt out of the system. Some of the countries which
were able to defend their parity against massive spec-
ulative attacks, like France, could count on strong
cooperation with Germany (mainly in the form of liq-
uidity support), but especially on the fact that interest
rates within the system would fall rapidly, once excess
demand in Germany was reduced by the effective
revaluation of the D-mark. In this sense, the break-up
of the system, and extensive and large devaluation by
the periphery, allowed the core to remain intact. 
A key lesson from this analysis is that, as long as fun-
damental imbalances are not corrected, and confi-
dence crises are not contained, the functioning of the
payment and financial system will come at the price of
persistently large, or even growing, balance-of-pay-
ments deficits. Limiting Target accounts will increase
the likelihood of an at least partial break-up of the
Eurosystem. 
However, large Target imbalances are worrisome for a
number of reasons. Firstly, they show that public cap-
ital flows have replaced private flows which, if it were
to continue over time, would distort the allocation of
resources within the euro area. Secondly, they sub-
stantially reallocate credit and wealth risks between
the countries of the euro area. A default by one state
or by residents in one state raises the taxpayers’ bill
across Europe proportionately. The losses are nomi-
nally born by the Eurosystem as a whole, but they are
allocated to the NCBs in proportion to their ECB
capital keys, which basically reflect country size. The
NCBs, in turn, have to be recapitalised by either
retaining profits, which otherwise would be distrib-
uted to the respective national treasuries or by out-
right capital injections from governments. In either
case national tax payers foot the bill. Moreover,
should the Eurosystem break up, multilateral target
liabilities may in principle turn into bilateral liabilities,
de facto aggravating the situation of the creditors.25
As long as the Eurosystem provides liquidity at a euro
area wide fixed price to banks, the Target system can
provide virtually unlimited credit to finance massive
reshuffling of portfolios across borders, not to men-
tion large current account imbalances.
The key problem highlighted by the above consider-
ations is that the current state of the monetary union
is not sustainable, as a mix of fundamental imbal-
ances and confidence factors are creating increasing
tension between the crisis countries and the rest of
the euro area.
2.5 The rescue operations
As the sovereign spreads on government bonds grew
high and volatile in crisis countries, and the balance
sheets of the NCBs increasingly worsened, as shown
in Figures 2.8 and 2.9, the ECB increased its pressure
on euro area governments to help out with relief oper-
ations. There were several steps in this development. 
Firstly, on 8/9 May 2010 a 110 billion euros package
for Greece was agreed (80 billion euros from the
European Union and 30 billion euros from the IMF).
Other rescue mechanisms were also enacted. They
included the EFSF, with a volume of 440 billion
euros, the European Financial Stability Mechanism
(EFSM), with a volume of 60 billion euros, which
were basically funds available for the European
Commission, as well as a 250 billion euro supplement
from the IMF.
On 29 November 2010, a 62.7 billion euros package
for Ireland was agreed, which was taken out of the
previously agreed rescue facilities (IMF: 22.5 billion
euros, EFSM: 22.5 billion euros and EFSF: 17.7 bil-
lion euros).
On 17 May 2011, a 78 billion euros facility for Por  -
tugal was agreed, to which the EFSF, EFSM and IMF
each contributed 26 billion euros.
On 21 July 2011 the euro area leaders extended the
volume of the EFSF from 440 billion euros to 780 bil-
lion euros in order to be able to effectively lend
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440 billion euros. This required ratifications by all of
the euro area parliaments, which were completed on
13 October 2011.
On 26 October 2011 a second bail-out package of
130 billion euros for Greece was agreed upon. 
Figure 2.10 summarises the rescue activities, incorpo-
rating Target credits, up until October 2011 and ECB
purchases of government bonds up until 13 January
2012 It is based upon the most recent data available at
the time of writing. The first column shows the funds
actually committed, and the second column the
potential commitments, including IMF help and the
enhanced EFSF.
The figure shows that the overall public credit vol-
ume granted to the GIIPS countries, as far as this
can be determined to date (see footnote), has risen
to 1,058 billion euros, and none of this credit has
thus far been repaid. Interestingly enough, at
678 billion euros the ECB’s implicit and explicit res-
cue operations are far bigger than the credit help
granted to particular countries by the parliaments of
the euro area, which totals only 381 billion euros.26
However, as the second column shows, the potential
overall rescue facility by the community of states
and the ECB totalling 1,878 billion euros is much
bigger than the sum granted to individual states up
to this point.
The third and fourth columns
show the theoretical maximum
liabilities that the current institu-
tional setting would imply for
Germany and France should (a)
the GIIPS countries default and
their collateral become worthless
while (b) the euro as such contin-
ue to exist. In this case the
German share in the ECB losses
increases from Germany’s statu-
tory 27 percent to 43 percent,
while the French share increases
from 20 percent to 32 percent.
This explains the respective dark
blue and red portions of these
columns. The remaining portions
are explained by the potential
maximum losses in the EFSF as
laid down in the underlying
treaty, the countries’ respective
shares in the EU budget and the respective shares in
the IMF budgets. At the beginning of 2012, the max-
imum total German liability amounted to 594 billion
euros and the corresponding French liability to 415
billion euros. Of course, these calculations are carried
out keeping other things equal: the economic ‘Arma  -
geddon’ brought about by a generalised default in the
euro area will by itself create massive economic losses
of a size that is difficult to forecast. 
The size of the official packages agreed upon since
2010 is not small per se, but there is a clear reason why
the piecemeal approach to the crisis adopted so far, in
uncertain and contradictory steps, has provided no
solution to the crisis. Addressing the crisis will call for
a clear definition of the future financial and fiscal
architecture of the euro area, as well as one that pro-
vides a clear sense of direction towards a sustainable
single currency. It will also require decisive interven-
tions in the short-term to stem destabilising confi-
dence crises at their roots.
2.6 Reforming the EMU
The euro area’s internal problems, with the emergence
of large and volatile risk premiums and large balance-
of-payments imbalances, have arguably arisen as a
result of fundamental asymmetries across its borders,
which have grown out of proportion due to massive
underestimation of credit risk within the union before
the eruption of the global crisis and the lack of effec-
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26 The help granted to a particular country includes the money con-
ditionally promised, such as the money earmarked for Greece, pro-
vided Greece meets the conditions of the European Commission, the
IMF and the ECB, the so-called ‘troika’. tion of credit risk after the announcement of the euro
introduction led to overly rapid and unfounded inter-
est rate convergence and excessive capital flows,
which, in turn, created inflationary bubbles, mispric-
ing and excessive risk-taking in the periphery coun-
tries while arguably contributing to a stagnation in the
core (see EEAG 2011). In some countries, this led to
huge current account deficits and dangerously high
net foreign debt positions, which undermined the
creditworthiness of some countries (see Figure 2.6).
In the case of Ireland, high public liabilities generated
by the rescue of the banking sector combined with
smaller, but non-negligible, external deficits made the
national economy extremely vulnerable. The position
of Italy, fragile because of the large stock of public
debt, has further deteriorated with the global crisis,
due to the atypical emergence of current account
deficits in recessionary years, as a result of competi-
tiveness losses. 
When the US crisis swept over to Europe and capital
markets became aware of the risks at stake, country-
specific interest rates diverged and capital fled to the
core in waves, starting from the smallest and more
exposed countries. With a large current account
deficit to finance, the periphery replaced the missing
private capital with public credit that commercial
banks were able to draw out of the Eurosystem mask-
ing or even fostering the imbalances that may ulti-
mately threaten the stability and existence of the
EMU as a whole. 
The euro area urgently needs measures to correct the
existing imbalances and reduce interest divergence
and capital flight, enabling the system to return to a
sustainable equilibrium. Achieving all these goals is
extremely difficult, perhaps even impossible since a
number of the proposed measures to provide short-
term relief create difficult trade-offs and conflicts
with desirable long-run equilibriums. Regaining com-
petitiveness requires crisis countries to engineer real
devaluations. But with a large stock of public and pri-
vate liabilities denominated in euros, falling prices
raise the real burden of debt, implying that fiscal
stress may be rising in the process of disinflation. This
suggests that relative price adjustment, which is
bound to be painful and time consuming, must be
combined with liquidity support. The risk inherent in
this strategy is that, to avoid financial disaster now,
the European Union will de facto accept open-ended
support to countries that ultimately turn out to be
insolvent. In this case, the tax payers in those coun-
tries giving the support will in the end face large costs,
which may lead to a political revolt that could kill the
whole euro project as we know it. The risk inherent in
the alternative strategy, avoiding open-ended support
at all costs to ‘save the euro’ in the long run, is that it
could – if the worst comes to the worst – lead to finan-
cial catastrophe now.
Another key issue concerns the creation of a common
safe asset in the euro area. The immediate introduc-
tion of Eurobonds or other systems of collective lia-
bility would arguably provide short-term relief to
periphery countries, but also effectively restore the
distorted pre-crisis system of neglected investment
risks within the euro area – a system which is likely to
again lead to macroeconomic, current account and
net foreign asset imbalances. Without a safe asset,
however, the euro area would constantly be subject to
massive and destabilising capital movements and
flight. In addition, normal operations by the ECB
would be constantly challenged by the lack of any
clear distinction between monetary and financial sta-
bility on the one hand, and fiscal stability on the
other.
Below we discuss the trade-offs on both accounts:
correcting competitiveness with a large stock of debt
denominated in euros, and creating a safe class of
assets in the euro area.
2.6.1 Realigning relative wages and prices under a
large debt denominated in euros
In the absence of open realignment possibilities by
way of exchange rate adjustment, the most arduous
task facing the euro area for the remainder of this
decade is that of bringing its internal relative price
and wage levels back to a sustainable equilibrium.
Only such realignment will make it possible to reduce
the euro area’s internal current account imbalances
and create the conditions for sustaining the internal
debt that has accumulated so far. Indeed, for some of
the crisis countries, reducing net foreign debt is ulti-
mately the way to regain the full confidence of capital
markets. 
In principle, the necessary rewinding of the clock
could be achieved via deflation in the periphery
and/or inflation in the core. Both alternatives, howev-
er, will meet with high resistance. Inflation in
Germany would undermine the country’s acceptance
of the euro and threaten the survival of any govern-
ment tolerating it. The reason for this is well known:
EEAG Report 2012 72
Chapter 2EEAG Report 2012 73
Chapter 2
given Germany's experiences with hyperinflation in
the 1920s, even the remotest fear of inflation will trig-
ger political resistance. Deflation in the periphery
countries, which were used to high and persistent
inflation even before the euro, will in turn require
severe austerity measures that force the economy
down with a degree of rigour that may well bring peo-
ple onto the streets, and even threaten the stability of
the political system.
A key problem is that national private and public debt
is no longer denominated in a domestic currency, as it
was prior to the introduction of the euro. In the
1992–93 crisis, any country that exited the European
Exchange Rate Mechanism and devalued immediate-
ly became more competitive without suffering any
adverse effect on the government and private debt sit-
uation. Today, any drop in domestic prices to regain
competitiveness (or an exit from the euro area without
changing external debt into national currency) would
at the same time raise the burden of debt in relation to
nominal domestic income. Thus, unlike previous
episodes of realignment in Europe, the benefits from
real devaluation are going to be tempered, if not off-
set, by its adverse balance sheet effects for firms and
the government (Corsetti 2010, Krugman 2011b and
EEAG 2011).27 This problem is well known, especial-
ly in relation to the experiences of Latin American
countries, where devaluations have been systematical-
ly associated with large contractions, financial crises
and debt defaults.28
Yet there are instances suggesting that it is not impos-
sible to gain competitiveness via real depreciation that
results from cutting wages and prices, or letting them
inflate by less than in other countries. Latvia de  -
creased its price level by 8 percent within only one
year (2009Q1–2010Q1) after an internal wage moder-
ation agreement had been achieved, and Ireland cut
its price level by over 14 percent compared to its euro
area trading partners over a period of five years
(2006Q3–2011Q2), after its house price bubble burst. 
In Latvia the government could count on at least
three favourable features of the economy at the time
of the internal devaluation. Firstly, public debt was
small – hence the fall in the price level did not have a
strong impact on the fiscal burden of the country, via
the implicit rise in the real value of public liabilities.
Secondly, the country size is small, which made it easy
to find a compromise between all relevant social
groups. Thirdly, Latvia wanted to enter the euro area
and knew it would jeopardise its entry chances with
an open depreciation.29 Nonetheless, a large external
debt implied that real devaluation had strong negative
wealth effects on private firms and households. Latvia
accepted a 20 percent decrease in its real GDP. In the
case of Ireland, the prospects of a successful devalua-
tion were enhanced by productivity growth and the
existence of a manufacturing sector that quickly
recovered as it was able to sell at lower prices.
Germany also depreciated by 22 percent against its
euro area trading partners in the period from 1995 to
2008, as shown by Figure 2.4. This process coincided
with a period of stagnation, unemployment and out-
flows of capital. Only 3 percentage points of Ger  -
many’s real depreciation were due to exchange rate
adjustment before the currency parities were fixed
within the euro area. The remaining 19 percentage
points of the country’s depreciation were due to pure
price adjustments within the euro area, with most of
the gains coming from higher price dynamics abroad,
rather than price compression at home. 
Unfortunately, the crisis countries are not in the same
position as Germany. Firstly, given the definition of
price stability by the ECB and the long tradition of
low inflation rates in Germany, it will be difficult to
trim domestic inflation significantly below the euro-
area level to regain competitiveness. Secondly, since
they are borrowers rather than lenders, they do not
have the time for a gradual adjustment of more than
a decade. 
While there is some uncertainty about the size of the
adjustment, the realignment required by Greece and
Portugal is likely to be much larger than that needed
by Ireland. Their pre-crisis current account deficit-
to-GDP ratios were about three times as large as
Ireland’s. EEAG (2011) estimated that Greece would
need a real depreciation of between 16.5 percent and
33 percent.30 OECD purchasing power parity esti-
mates suggest that Greece would need a depreciation
of 31 percent to reach the price level of Turkey,31 a
country that enjoys similar specialisation advan-
tages. Of course, a slightly higher inflation target for
27 For an extensive discussion of this problem see in particular
EEAG (2011), Chapter 3.
28 On that continent it is commonly dubbed ‘original sin’, to stress
the profound macroeconomic consequences of being unable to bor-
row in domestic currency. 
29 Prime minister Valdis Dombrovskis in a speech given to the
Munich Economic Summit, May 2010. 
30 See EEAG (2011), p. 119. 
31 According to OECD purchasing power parity for GDP (see
OECD online database http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?dataset-
code=SNA_TABLE4).the ECB, which we have argued in favour of in earli-
er reports, would bring some relief.32 However, any
relief provided via this channel will necessarily be
quite limited.
Remarkably, although the European economy has
been in crisis for several years now; there is, with the
exception of Ireland, little sign of any real deprecia-
tion to date in the crisis-hit countries; or if the process
has begun, its impact has been minimal according to
the data available at the time of this writing. Looking
at the GDP deflator, the measure of the price level for
domestic output, Spain depreciated by only 0.5 per-
cent and Portugal by just 0.3 percent from 2008 to the
second quarter of 2011. Greece appreciated by 1 per-
cent, while Italy appreciated even further by 1.4 per-
cent. As previously, all data refer to changes in the
GDP deflator relative to the respective euro area trad-
ing partners.33 Stronger depreciations will have to be
realised in the years to come.
An argument often put forward in political debate is
that the crisis countries should be able to ‘grow’ out of
their foreign debt problems, rather than overcoming
them by way of real depreciation. Unfortunately, this
argument does not hold, in particular if ‘growth' is
supposed to be generated by deficit spending and
loose public budget constraints (a definition often
adopted by politicians when speaking of the need to
foster ‘growth’).34 In this case, more demand would
come at the cost of larger government debt accumula-
tion. Moreover, without real depreciation, economic
recovery tends to increase imports. The trade deficits,
which in all crisis countries except Ireland have been
contributing to the current account deficits, are there-
fore most likely to increase, resulting in further accu-
mulation of foreign liabilities in that case. 
Sweden in the early 1990s, discussed in Chapter 4,
provides a vivid illustration of the importance of real
exchange rate depreciation and net export growth in
order to come out of a sovereign debt crisis without a
long period of stagnation. Given that a realignment
of exchange rates is not possible, periphery countries
will have to go through a period of diminished nomi-
nal income growth, if not nominal income shrinkage,
to correct unsustainable domestic and foreign debt
levels. This will be necessary to strengthen the com-
petitiveness of their exports and keep their imports
down.
It could be that some countries with excessive realign-
ment needs will find it too difficult to go through the
real depreciation required within the euro area and
may contemplate the option of leaving the euro area
and reintroducing a national currency that is allowed
to depreciate against the euro. Sometimes this possi-
bility is discussed in terms of a temporary exit (‘tak-
ing a sabbatical from the euro’). In our view, it is
essential that the decision of whether or not to stay in
the euro area be left to individual countries, and
should not automatically imply that these countries
also have to leave the European Union.
An exit from the euro would make the currency
denomination of debt contracts within and outside
the country an even larger issue, since a large and
quick depreciation would amount to a corresponding-
ly large increase in the value of debt in terms of
domestic output if the debt remained denominated in
euros. However, as we pointed out in EEAG (2011),
Chapter 2, an essential advantage of an external
depreciation after exiting the euro consists in the
automatic redenomination of the internal bank debt
of private agents. With both an internal and an exter-
nal devaluation, balance sheets would be distorted to
the extent that agents hold foreign debt, but only an
internal devaluation with falling domestic prices
would aggravate the position of companies as their
real assets would lose value, while their bank debt
would remain unchanged. 
Changing the denomination of the external debt
would, in principle, be desirable, but is technically
more complex, and arguably has greater conse-
quences. In the euro area, public debt contracts are
written under national law, but external private debt is
written under foreign law. At least for private con-
tracts, the burden of the external debt cannot be low-
ered by nominal depreciation. In any case, experience
with country defaults suggests that countries depreci-
ating their external debt might be bracing themselves
for years of limited access to international financial
markets, and may encounter high risk premiums.
A default would, of course, be a huge burden for the
creditor countries, which would have to write off
some of their claims. If only Greece and/or Portugal
were to default, this burden would be relatively small
and surmountable. However, there is the risk of fur-
ther bandwagon effects and destabilising expectations
which, if not contained, would impose negative exter-
nalities on other countries by causing bank runs and
large-scale bankruptcies by financial institutions like
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pension funds and insurance companies. This could
trigger an economic crisis, which could potentially
result in a deep international contraction. The politi-
cal ramifications for the euro project, and hence for
the future of the European Union, are impossible to
predict.
The euro area therefore has the choice between
Scylla and Charybdis. There will either be a pro-
longed period of pain, stagnation and internal polit-
ical friction in the periphery countries or a financial
and political crisis in the euro area that challenges its
very existence. While we are unable to choose
between these options, we recommend that the euro
area countries and the ECB make active efforts to
keep crisis-stricken countries on board by providing
liquidity support to help them overcome their inter-
nal problems and to carry out the reforms that
would facilitate the process of real depreciation,
such as increasing labour market flexibility, liberalis-
ing firm entry and exit and privatisation. This sup-
port must not, however, be open-ended and turned
into large transfers of resources between solvent and
insolvent countries in the euro area. This raises yet
another dilemma. A situation could emerge whereby
Europe has to choose between government debt
restructurings for several countries with potentially
devastating effects on the financial system and a
deep downturn in the short run on the one hand and
massive transfers which may not in the end be polit-
ically viable and which may threaten the political
cohesion of the euro area on the other.
EEAG (2011), Chapter 2, specified a detailed crisis
procedure with well-defined support for the affected
countries, distinguishing between liquidity crisis,
impending insolvency, and full insolvency. Basically,
we emphasised the need to provide generous liquidity
help (of the kind provided by the Eurosystem or the
rescue funds) to countries that have reasonable
prospects of overcoming a crisis for a fixed period of
two years to complement reform efforts and policy
corrections. If liquidity turns out to be insufficient, or
if the realignment needed is too large for the country,
the report emphasised the need to offer help with a
gradual process of debt restructuring. 
We argued that, year by year, the then maturing gov-
ernment bonds could be subjected to a haircut of up
to 50 percent and be converted into new government
bonds secured at a rate of 80 percent by the commu-
nity of states (with a limit for the accumulated guar-
antees and public loans of 30 percent of GDP). In
economic terms, this proposal boils down to insuring
a country’s creditors against default, albeit with a
deductible: the first 60 percent of a potential default
loss is born by the creditor, and the remaining 40 per-
cent is born by the community of states, if necessary.
The main idea of the proposal is to specify implicit
upper bounds on losses incurred by creditors in order
to limit the interest rates that states would have to pay
for new government debt and to facilitate access to
capital markets.35
While problems of credibility of the rules affect
many of the proposals for restructuring mechanisms,
including ours, it is worth noting that any ‘fiscal
compact’ which simply denies the possibility of a
large crisis in some regions of the union, and hence
does not foresee the procedures to deal with it, is
incomplete, ineffective and dangerous. In practice,
such a ‘fiscal compact’ will, at best, amount to a
replay of the same, failed approach of the Maas  -
tricht Treaty, with an overdose of wishful thinking.
This is all the more so as it was agreed at the EU
summit launching the fiscal compact that the earlier
decided write-down of the Greek debt should be
regarded as unique and exceptional, and that voting
procedures within the ESM which is to replace the
EFSF are to be changed so that decisions on finan-
cial support no longer requires unanimity but only a
qualified majority. 
At the time of writing, serious reform efforts are
underway in the crisis-hit euro area countries. These
efforts need to be sustained and complemented at a
union level, avoiding politically unpalatable transfers,
but without sparing help with liquidity for a well-
defined time span when fundamentals justify it. Most
importantly, it is necessary to rapidly reach a consen-
sus on a desirable and sustainable institutional reform
for the euro, providing a much-needed sense of direc-
tion for individual countries.
2.6.2 Euro-standard bills 
Even in recent years, when credit risk was no longer
underestimated, the institutional setup of the
Eurosystem has maintained a fundamental dichoto-
my between government bonds and private assets that
35 The effect this has on interest rates depends on when default is
expected to take place and the maturity of the bond. Consider a ten-
year bond and a probability of default of 50 percent. If default is
expected to occur in ten years and thus only on the principal, a
spread of less than 3 percentage points is needed to compensate for
the default risk. If default is expected within a year, the spread is
about twice as high.bear a national risk premium, and ECB funds that are
available to all countries regardless of their creditwor-
thiness and default probabilities. As discussed at the
outset of this chapter, this implies that, as investors
may massively move from the riskier to the safer
national assets within the euro area, the effective
interest rates that countries have to pay for ECB refi-
nancing credit are lower the higher the default proba-
bility is for local banks and the lower the collateral
these banks provide to their NCBs. As long as ECB
lending does not account for market risk premiums,
the usual brake in the system is missing and capital
flights can become extremely large. Section 2.4 looked
at the alarming capital flight that has taken place
from the crisis countries in recent years.
The ECB has addressed the crisis with a growing
number of non-standard interventions and by reduc-
ing collateral requirements (see Table 2.1). Recently, it
even offered a tender for three-year refinancing credit
amounting to almost 500 billion euros.36
These measures constitute an attempt to stimulate
real private investment financed with borrowed funds
and bank purchases of government bonds. In other
words, they are motivated by the desire to reduce the
consequences for the private and public sector of an
increasing level of sovereign risk. Yet, unless concrete
reforms take place simultaneously that improve the
country’s credibility in the eyes of the markets, the
ECB policy runs the risk of becoming an attempt to
fill a bottomless pit. 
In reforming the architecture of the euro area two
mistakes are to be avoided. The first mistake consists
of creating artificial conditions leading to a mispric-
ing of credit risk. The damage done by years of risk
underestimation is clear not only in the euro area, but
also at a global level. A homogenous Eurobond, or
blanket cross-border guarantees for national debt
(even if they were feasible) would not be a good idea
for the reasons explained in some detail in EEAG
(2011) and reconsidered above. Compressing credit
risk creates mechanisms that favour the emergence of
large imbalances within the euro area. With imperfect
policy credibility, confidence factors may nonetheless
lead to disruptive pricing spirals, eventually under-
mining public and private debt sustainability due to
self-fulfilling expectations. Creating an institutional
system capable of stemming confidence crises is con-
sequently a priority for the new architecture of the
euro area.
The second mistake consists of overlooking a funda-
mental requirement for the smooth working of a
monetary union, namely the existence of a class of
assets sufficiently homogenous to provide the com-
mon safe assets in the area, required for monetary
operations and any kind of exchange requiring safe
collateral.
Let us consider possible benchmarks for a reform,
starting with a review of the US system. Unlike the
European Union or the euro area, the United States
is a federal state with a common legal system and
other tools to enforce central rules to be obeyed by
local states. The federal government has complete
power over a very large share of fiscal resources,
both on the taxing and the spending side. The bills
and bonds issued by the federal government are the
safe assets at the core of open market operations by
the central banks, and provide the ideal instrument
for collateralised transactions at both a private and a
public level.
The US Federal Reserve System is comparable to the
Eurosystem of central banks. The US system is split
into 12 districts, each with its own District Federal
Reserve Bank, or ‘District Fed’. Each district is of a
size comparable to that of a state in the euro area,
but the districts bear no geographical or legal rela-
tion to US states. In fact, the District Feds are owned
by private commercial banks. If residents of one dis-
trict want to purchase goods and assets in net terms
from other districts, Target-like liabilities are bilater-
ally booked in the Interdistrict Settlement Account
with regard to those District Feds where the money
is flowing to. Unlike in the euro area, the Target-like
liabilities have to be settled once a year (every April)
with marketable assets. These marketable assets are
held in a clearing pool administered by the Federal
Reserve Bank, and according to the net liabilities
that have built up; the ownership shares in the clear-
ing pool are reallocated between the District Feds.
The interest income earned by the pool of assets is
reallocated accordingly. Before the crisis, these assets
used to consist of gold-backed Treasury Bills of the
highest quality. During the crisis, and in conjunction
with the adoption of non-standard policies, Asset-
Backed Securities (ABS), which are of lower quality
but pay higher yields, were also included in the clear-
ing pool. 
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The need to settle Target-like balances with mar-
ketable assets has arguably provided a brake prevent-
ing the accumulation of major cross-district imbal-
ances in the US system to date, because the banking
system of a district reaps no advantage by drawing a
Target-like credit, given that its interest cost is the
same as that charged by the local commercial banks
for borrowing the funds in the interbank market. If
the residents in a district want to acquire goods or
assets in net terms from other districts, they must sell
an appropriate amount of assets in exchange (includ-
ing the ‘sale’ of certificates of debt or debentures). In
Europe, Target liabilities do not have to be settled;
they may stay on the books and cannot be called due
by the NCBs holding the Target claims. The interest
on these liabilities is the ECB’s main refinancing rate,
which is substantially lower than the interbank rate
for the crisis-hit countries. At the time of writing, for
example, the ECB refinancing rate is 1 percent, while
the interbank lending rate to Italian banks is around
5 percent (and Italian government bonds offer yields
of about 6–7 percent due to their longer maturity). 
There is, of course, in principle nothing wrong with
preserving the central bank’s ability to pursue explicit
policies of liquidity support to banks, whether this
liquidity support gives rise to accounting records in
Target, or simply substitutes intermediation between
two German/French/Dutch banks in trouble. The US
example does not highlight any need to limit the
ECB’s capacity to use certain instruments, when there
are good reasons for using them.
The main lesson to be learnt from the US concerns
the smooth working of a common monetary policy
and payment system, distinguishing ordinary opera-
tions from non-standard operations. This problem lies
at the heart of a desirable reform of the euro area
architecture, where the ECB council is currently
deciding on monetary policy and accepting assets
with quite different risk and prices as homogenous
collateral, with discounts that do not reflect market
discounts. Both the conduct of a single monetary pol-
icy, and the virtuous coexistence of independent states
giving rise to country-specific risk, requires the cre-
ation of a class of assets with prices that are, to a large
extent, insulated from local imbalances.
When considering an initiative of this dimension, the
creation of a Eurobond would be consistent with the
creation of the euro. A Eurobond would guarantee
the same interest rate for all euro area countries and
would gradually bring all of them into the same rat-
ing category by converting their outstanding old debt
into Eurobonds. In the end, government bonds would
have an interest rate that differs from the ECB refi-
nancing rate only by the difference in maturity, mak-
ing the arbitrage incentive disappear. 
However, unlike in the United States, the coexistence
of independent states in the euro area implies that a
homogenous Eurobond with a single interest rate for
government bonds would distort the pricing of risk,
creating an incentive to over-borrow and over-lend.
The allocation of capital in the euro area would be
determined by a common institution mutually guar-
anteeing the investment of distinct individual borrow-
ing states. The perils of this approach are highlighted
in EEAG (2011) and shortly discussed again in
Section 2.3 of this chapter: these consist of distorted
allocation of capital and production, affecting growth
and welfare across borders, as well as hampering
growth at the aggregate euro area level.
Even if, one day, the euro area were to become a com-
mon political entity with the requisite legal and actu-
al enforcement devices, a Eurobond enabling individ-
ual states to borrow at the same interest rate would
not be advisable. Surely, the common European state
would have to possess the right to borrow itself, but
that would not be the same as Eurobonds. After all,
even the United States has no instrument that would
allow individual states to borrow at the same interest
rates. Apart from worrisome implications for the
redistribution of wealth risks and interest costs
among the current European nations, which are like-
ly to give rise to political conflict, policies that equate
the interest rates for government bonds create incen-
tives to increase public debt levels (and indirectly pri-
vate debt levels), de facto re-establishing the pre-2008
situation, whereby the convergence of interest rates
caused a misallocation of resources in the euro area.
The countries benefitting from low interest rates are
likely to pursue expansionary fiscal and financial
policies, rather than using the interest advantage to
finance structural reforms in the economy and ensure
a sustainable path for their public finances. The dan-
ger of cross-country imbalances, large capital move-
ments sustaining uncompetitive equilibriums and
persistent current account imbalances will once again
be high.
Before the United States was able to solve this prob-
lem it underwent a difficult period of state defaults in
the nineteenth century, which ultimately made it clear
that no interstate rescue programs would be available.This experience then led to the formulation of strict
budget rules, limiting the state debt to a minimum.
We are afraid that Europe will also have to suffer
painful experiences before the requisite fiscal disci-
pline can be achieved. In the wake of the EU
Summit on 8 De  cember 2011 in particular, the euro
area countries are trying to limit the problem of
excessive public borrowing by introducing a fiscal
union with political controls over state budgets
based on the idea that the ultimate roots of imbal-
ances are fiscal.37 While this may seem reasonable
and in keeping with the tradition of the euro’s insti-
tutional development, it is hard to believe that, hav-
ing failed in the past, the same approach will work
in the future. 
On the one hand, there have been multiple sources of
imbalances: some of the countries now facing
financing external debt problems actually used to
run low public deficits and low public debt-to-GDP
ratios in the first few years of the euro. On the other
hand, the key problem is that it is not possible to set
the debt constraints in stone and enforce automatic
correction mechanisms. Thus, while the agreements
of the EU Summit of December 2011 are to be wel-
comed in the sense that they re-establish, at least
partly, an agenda for stronger ties within Europe,
they may not take us very far on their own. Even if
member countries do write debt constraints into
their constitutions, it is doubtful that this constitutes
a safeguard against a violation. After all, some euro
area countries do not even have a Supreme Court
that could enforce such constitutional rules, while
others give their citizens only limited possibilities to
appeal to the Supreme Court. 
The concrete danger is that the failure of the Stability
Pact in the past will merely be repeated. There are two
strong reasons to believe that this would indeed be the
case. Firstly, although sanctions (fines) are intended
to become automatic, a qualified majority can subse-
quently still stop them. Hence, these decisions are still
political. Past experience shows the unwillingness of
finance ministers to punish their peers, which is easy
to understand, as each finance minister realises that
s/he may be in a similar situation in the future, mak-
ing lenience with sinners a good investment in the
future. Secondly, a fine, which a country can borrow
to pay for and then hope to be bailed-out by others, is
not a very frightening disincentive to irresponsible
behaviour. 
It is therefore highly probable that the fiscal compact
does not go far enough in combining massive support
to crisis countries with a monetary union that is sus-
tainable in the long run. A more ambitious fiscal com-
pact, transferring sanction decisions from the political
to the judicial sphere (the European Court of Justice)
as we suggested in our 2003 report, along with the
introduction of non-pecuniary sanctions, such as loss
of voting power in the Council, would ultimately be
required.38 However, such developments appear high-
ly unlikely in the foreseeable future.
Europe obviously needs a true fiscal compact.
Without it, no currency union with independent states
is possible, especially in a situation where, as a result
of the crisis, virtually all European states have experi-
enced an increase in their debt. Once debt become
unsustainable in a large region within the euro area,
the pressure on other member states to come up with
rescue packages involving more than liquidity support
(as well as on the ECB to monetise public debt) –
although in violation of the no-bail-out principle – is
bound to become very strong. This course of events
could sow discord and disruption in Europe. 
The alternative of moving towards a US-like system
seems more likely to provide stability in the long run.
A major pillar of such a system would be a class of
homogenous short-term assets providing the common
collateral for monetary policy and the annual cross-
border settlement of Target balances. The need to set-
tle the Target credit with the safe asset would elimi-
nate the automatic provision of subsidised credit via
the payment system, without, of course, preventing
the possibility of providing credit via other forms of
interventions. This is likely to create a disincentive for
countries to draw Target credit, and for leading pri-
vate banks to offer higher interest rates for (interna-
tional) interbank loans. In that way, the proposed
arrangement would work against capital flight,
instead of stimulating it.39
An important question, however, is how to construct
such a class of homogenous short-term assets in the
absence of a strong and large federal fiscal system
without, at the same time, violating the ‘liability prin-
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ciple’? Most proposals for Eurobonds or Eurobills are
motivated by precisely this question; indeed, they
explicitly recognise the need to avoid the cross-sub-
sidisation of the risk of independent jurisdictions
within the euro area.40 They tend to either limit the
amount of Eurobonds or Eurobills that a country can
issue in terms of its GDP, or earmark tax revenues, de
facto giving the community instruments a senior sta-
tus. The main idea of these proposals is to approxi-
mate the US architecture, by creating the analogue of
US federal bonds via a set of guarantees and collater-
alised borrowing, a possibility difficult to envisage
unless a common European state is formed. 
Following this very logic, however, there is a simpler
and arguably more practical way to pursue the same
goal that avoids the risk of over-borrowing when cre-
ating a joint liability. The idea is as follows: each
country issues short-term treasury bills satisfying
strict common standards, which are to be jointly
supervised, so as to share the same risk profile. These
bills would be collateralised with future tax revenue or
real estate and standardised. Although each state
would still retain full responsibility for servicing its
own debt, in the new regime these nationally differen-
tiated bills with strict common standards would trade
within a few points from each other, providing the
common financial asset for the ordinary operations of
the ECB. They could also be used as collateral to set-
tle financial flows between private agents.
Governments would retain full responsibility for ser-
vicing the bills. In fact, they would be committed to
service them in full, before ordinary government
bonds could be serviced. With such a new fiscal com-
pact, these national bills, which could be dubbed
‘euro-standard’ bills, would circulate together with
ordinary bonds, both priced by the markets. No gov-
ernment should be allowed to issue more ‘euro-stan-
dard’ bills than an amount consistent with the expec-
tation that the issuing state itself will be able to ser-
vice them, which for transparency’s sake could be set
as a limit in percent of GDP. Country-specific risk
would thus primarily drive the price of ordinary
bonds, providing at the margin the right signal and
incentive to governments to take corrective actions
should they stray from the path of debt sustainabili-
ty. The risk of a state-specific bankruptcy giving rise
to interest premiums would not contain any implicit
borrowing subsidy as potentially implied by a Euro  -
bond system. 
A sufficiently large pool of bills with similar char-
acteristics would make it possible to draw a clearer
distinction between standard monetary policy oper-
ations, cross-settlement, and non-standard opera-
tions in support of the payment and financial sys-
tem. In a system whereby, having learnt the lessons
taught by the current crisis, European governments
apply more rigorous principles of policy sustain-
ability, it is not inconceivable that euro-standard
bills would circulate widely and become highly sub-
stitutable for each other. 
Several fairly complex issues would have to be tackled
in the transition to such a new institutional setting.
There are well-known problems related to diluting
existing debt instruments by introducing new ones
with seniority status. The fact that we suggest short-
term bills rather than long-term bonds will limit this
danger and make it possible to define exceptions from
the so-called ‘negative-pledge clauses’ that prevent
countries from issuing bonds senior to those already
circulating in the market. These transition issues are
common to other, related proposals. 
Euro-standard bills are not a solution to all of the
challenges currently faced by the countries in the euro
area. For instance, they provide no vehicle for creating
a cap on interest rates to stem an expectations-driven
crisis. Their introduction could nonetheless favour the
process of rebuilding policy credibility that in some
European countries, most notably Italy, has primarily
affected the interest rates paid on debt instruments
with short maturity. It could also be combined with
other schemes, and eventually ease the transition to
forms of closer fiscal integration.
2.7 Conclusions
The euro was primarily and essentially a political ini-
tiative, motivated by the ultimate goal of enhancing
pacific coexistence and prosperity in Europe after the
horrific experiences of two world wars. This ultimate
goal is invaluable. The method followed to date to
achieve this goal, however, may have created the
premise for a major setback.
European integration has proceeded by pushing for-
ward incomplete institutions that readily become dys-
functional when confronted with rapidly changing
economic reality. From a treaty comes a crisis, which
leads to a new treaty, or a patch-up of the old one.
Technical glitches and mistakes are either not under- 40 Brunnermeier et al. (2011) and Hellwig and Philippon (2011).stood by the governments signing the treaties, or per-
haps ignored, with the idea that political agreements
can always find a way out of a crisis. This method is
acceptable as long as the rules are not too dysfunc-
tional, and there is a model of adjustment that works. 
The question is whether the economies adopting the
euro locked themselves into a system with no feasible
adjustment mechanism. As a result of the capital
flows the euro triggered, countries in the core of the
euro area have run surpluses and have maintained low
inflation, and countries outside the core have run
deficits, or have large enough debts to be easily
pushed into unsustainable macroeconomic dynamics.
The euro was introduced at a time when credit risk
was utterly under-priced at a world level, and this con-
tributed to under-pricing in Europe. In a similar way
that low income, unskilled people in the United States
could easily obtain mortgages to buy homes, govern-
ments and households in the periphery of the euro
area could tap international financial markets. The
result was a build-up of explicit and implicit liabilities,
accompanied by inflation differentials that amounted
to a major misalignment of prices.
To correct these misalignments, periphery countries
will have to become more competitive by becoming
cheaper. However, this would mean that these coun-
tries’ debt levels will increase in real terms. As for
Latin American countries burdened by dollar-denom-
inated debt, or for Baltic and Central European states
burdened by euro-denominated debt, a devaluation
creates destabilising balance sheet effects. For all prac-
tical purposes, from the vantage point of each coun-
try in the union, the euro is a foreign currency.
When the global crisis hit in 2008, internal imbalances
led markets to question the stability of the periphery,
accelerating the process whereby brewing tensions
turn into a full-blown disruptive economic storm.
Massive capital flight forced governments to raise the
interest on their debt and induced commercial banks
to draw refinancing credit from their NCBs, planting
the seeds of controversial fiscal issues in the event of
a break-up.
The situation in the euro area has been allowed to
develop into such a deep crisis that there are no easy
solutions to it. Instead, very difficult trade-offs may
have to be made. Providing large-scale help to the cri-
sis-hit countries can avoid an immediate financial cri-
sis, but entails large risks if liquidity problems turn
out to be solvency problems, as this will imply losses
for tax payers in the countries footing the bill. Such
losses could lead to a political reaction in these coun-
tries, killing support for the euro in the long-term.
Internal devaluations in the crisis-hit countries will be
long and painful, and risk creating political resent-
ment against the European Union. Although the con-
sequences are difficult to predict, the exit from the
euro area of a crisis country such as Greece could
speed up adjustment in that country, but is likely to
exacerbate the situation for others. Closer fiscal inte-
gration is a way of enabling massive support for crisis
countries, but the fiscal compact does not deliver it
and political support for true fiscal integration is
unlikely in the foreseeable future. 
Systems that effectively discipline Target credits are
good for the future – making support decisions
become more transparent and discretionary – but it is
less clear what implications they have in the short run.
By having the ECB no longer offer credit at below-
market interest rates to countries facing capital flight,
on the one hand, monetary conditions in these coun-
tries would be more restrictive, deteriorating overall
demand. On the other hand, it would increase incen-
tives for private capital from abroad to invest in these
countries, thereby reducing capital flight and fostering
overall supply.
The development of the euro crisis is impossible to
forecast. Our hope is that the euro area will be able
to ‘muddle through’, but we fear that the process
will, at best, be long and painful. At worst, policy-
makers will face a situation whereby they have to
choose between massive interventions, which could
prevent an immediate financial crisis, but lead to the
euro’s demise in the long run because of its political
ramifications, and a stricter stance, which could be
viable in the long run but may lead to an acute finan-
cial crisis and deep economic distress in the immedi-
ate future.
In this chapter we have attempted to define a feasible
solution to the problem of creating a class of highly
substitutable, high quality assets to carry out day-to-
day monetary policy and keep the payment system
running smoothly. This is one element for the euro
area’s continued survival. Anticipating the economic
problems associated with a common Eurobond, our
proposal is to introduce euro-standard bills, issued by
each government, and for which each government
will be solely responsible. These bills, however, will
satisfy strict requirements that each state will com-
mit to enforce, subject to joint supervision, with the
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new fiscal compact. Once the regime is in place, these
new assets, collateralised and with seniority status,
should trade within a few points of each other. They
can be used for refinancing operations and the inter-
national settlement of Target balances. By bringing
the Euro  system closer to its US Federal Reserve
counterpart, the proposed euro-standard bill system
would contribute to monetary and financial stability
in Europe.
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